American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College
of Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Student Scholarship

8-1-2010

Stepping out of the Vehicle: The Potential of
Arizona v. Gant to End Automatic Searches
Incident to Arrest beyond the Vehicular Context
Angad Singh
American University Washington College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/stusch_lawrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Singh, Angad. “Stepping out of the Vehicle: The Potential of Arizona v. Gant to End Automatic Searches Incident to Arrest beyond the
Vehicular Context.” American University Law Review 59, no. 6 (August 2010): 1759-1795.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews & Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

SINGH_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

9/3/2010 10:48 AM

STEPPING OUT OF THE VEHICLE:
THE POTENTIAL OF ARIZOA V. GAT
TO END AUTOMATIC SEARCHES
INCIDENT TO ARREST BEYOND
THE VEHICULAR CONTEXT
ANGAD SINGH*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ............................................................................................. 1760
I.
Introducing the Search Incident to Arrest Exception and Gant .... 1763
A. Origins of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception ............... 1763
B. The Emergence of Bright-Line Rules .................................... 1766
C. Gant'’s Retraction of Search Incident to Arrest Power ......... 1770
II.
Gant'’s Reasonable to Believe Standard Pertains to the
Evidentiary Nature of the Crime ................................................... 1772
III. Gant'’s Potential to End Automatic Searches of Containers on
the Person Incident to Arrest ........................................................ 1776
A. Strengthening Chimel Beyond the Vehicular Context........... 1776
B. Applying Gant to Robinson Prevents a Search of the
Cigarette Pack ........................................................................ 1780
C. Perdoma's Faulty Application of Gant to a Search of a Bag . 1782
IV. Gant Undermines Automatic Searches of Homes Incident to
Arrest ............................................................................................ 1786
A. Taylor's Application of Gant in the Home Context ............... 1786
B. Gant Undermines an Automatic Buie Search ........................ 1789
V.
Overcoming Perverse Incentives .................................................. 1793
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 1796

* Senior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 60; J.D. Candidate,
American University, Washington College of Law, May 2011; B.A., Politics, 2007, Oberlin
College. Many thanks to Professor Elizabeth Boals for her valuable insights and guidance
throughout the writing and editing processes. I also greatly appreciate the assistance of the
staff of the American University Law Review. Finally, I am most grateful to my parents
and Emma for their boundless support and encouragement.

1759

SINGH_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1760

9/3/2010 10:48 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1759

INTRODUCTION
“Because the law says we can do it” was the response that Officer
Griffith offered when asked why officers searched Rodney Gant’s car when
he was arrested for driving with a suspended license.1 Officer Griffith’s
honest answer exemplifies the effect of prior Supreme Court decisions on
search incident to arrest power in the vehicle context: that a search of a
vehicle incident to arrest is a police entitlement divorced from any rationale
whatsoever.2 The legal justifications that permit warrantless searches
incident to arrest generally, concerns for officer safety and preservation of
evidence,3 had been utterly abandoned by the Court in the automobile
context.4 This police entitlement led to invasions of privacy against
persons guilty of no more than mere traffic violations as searches were
conducted simply because they were legally permissible.5 However, the
Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant6 shifted course and strengthened Fourth
Amendment protections by terminating the entitlement that permitted
vehicle searches incident to arrest as a matter of right.7
The tumultuous jurisprudence of the search incident to arrest doctrine
under the Fourth Amendment8 has often produced inconsistent and varied
1. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1715 (2009).
2. See id. at 1721 (recognizing that prior cases created a bright-line rule allowing a
vehicle search incident to arrest regardless of any reason); see also Thornton v. United
States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (lamenting lower court
decisions that deem a search of a vehicle incident to arrest as a right of the police rather than
as an exception to the warrant requirement that is justified only by a threat of harm to the
officers or destruction of evidence); James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the
Future of the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and
Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV 1417, 1436 (2007) (arguing that a bright-line rule for searches
incident to arrest was meant to extend to all vehicular arrests).
3. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767–68 (1969) (disallowing a search of an
entire house incident to arrest as it was not justified by a need to reduce a risk of officer
safety or destruction of evidence by the arrestee).
4. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (establishing a bright-line rule
permitting searches of vehicles incident to arrest in all circumstances, yet claiming fidelity
to Chimel); see also Thornton, 541 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that, due to
Belton, many lower courts have upheld vehicle searches incident to arrest when the arrestee
was handcuffed and secured in a police car); Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Breaking
Point: Embracing Justice Scalia’s Call for the Supreme Court to Abandon an
Unreasonable Approach to Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law, 82 TUL. L. REV.
77, 80 (2007) [hereinafter Bright Line] (asserting that Belton created a bright-line rule
permitting vehicle searches incident to arrest regardless of the crime for which the vehicle’s
occupant was arrested, and irrespective of the likelihood that the arrestee could access the
car to reach a weapon or destructible evidence).
5. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1722–23 (deploring invasions of privacy against those who
were arrested for committing minor traffic offenses); cf. Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth
Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime
of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 407 (2004) (asserting that the “worst feature” of the
Belton decision was the incentive it created for police to arrest in order to execute their
“broad search power”).
6. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
7. See infra Part IV (arguing that Gant overrules the bright-line automatic search rule).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The text of the Amendment reads:
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results.9 In keeping with this tradition, the Supreme Court in Gant revised
nearly thirty years of search incident to arrest law in the automobile
context.10 Unlike Gant’s predecessors, Gant generally enhanced Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches11 by holding that
automatic vehicle searches incident to arrest are unconstitutional.12 On the
other hand, Gant’s second holding created a new warrant exception to
govern searches of automobiles incident to arrest by allowing officers to
search a vehicle, even when the justifications of officer safety and
preservation of evidence are nonexistent.13
This Comment argues that Gant not only enhances Fourth Amendment
protections overall by limiting authority to search an automobile upon
arrest, but that its first holding also undermines other cases permitting
automatic searches incident to arrest in nonvehicular situations.14 Gant’s
affirmation of two specific rationales that permit a search incident to

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
9. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1421–27 (tracing the history of search incident to
arrest law and outlining the Court’s rapid expansions and retractions of search incident to
arrest power); see also Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723 (describing the “checkered history” of
search incident to arrest law).
10. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1726 (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority
opinion overruled twenty-eight year old precedent).
11. See Bright Line, supra note 4, at 103 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s approach, later
adopted in Gant, would abandon automatic searches and thereby reduce the incentive for
pretextual arrests motivated by a desire to search). But see, e.g., David S. Rudstein, Belton
Redux: Reevaluating Belton’s Per Se Rule Governing the Search of an Automobile Incident
to an Arrest, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287, 1345–46 (2005) (dismissing Justice Scalia’s
approach, later adopted in Gant, as insufficiently protective of Fourth Amendment rights).
Gant furthers Fourth Amendment privacy protections vis-à-vis the automatic vehicle search
rule. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721 (refusing to construe prior case law broadly in order to
enhance Fourth Amendment privacy protections).
12. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721 (stating that automatic vehicle searches incident to
arrest are police entitlements that are “anathema” to the Fourth Amendment).
13. See id. at 1719 (holding that a search of a vehicle incident to arrest is permissible
when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest would be found in the
vehicle); Jason Hermele, Comment, Arizona v. Gant: Rethinking the Evidence-Gathering
Justification for the Search Incident to Arrest Exception, and Testing a ew Approach, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 195 (2009) (noting that Gant reigns in expansive search incident to
arrest power, but adopts a new evidence gathering rationale that is not governed by probable
cause).
14. E.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (allowing law enforcement to
automatically search closets and areas adjoining the place of arrest); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (formalizing the power to automatically search a
person and containers on the person incident to arrest by reasoning that a lawful arrest itself
creates search authority); United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1991)
(utilizing a test that always permits a search of the place of arrest in the home context); see
infra Part IV (arguing that Gant undermines the authority to automatically search containers
on the person incident to arrest); infra Part V (arguing that Gant abrogates automatic
searches incident to arrest in the home).
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arrest,15 officer safety and the preservation of evidence, directly conflicts
with nonvehicular cases allowing automatic searches irrespective of these
rationales.16 Since Gant undermines such cases by reconnecting the search
incident to arrest exception with its justifications, applying Gant to cases
that permit automatic searches of containers on the person,17 and certain
automatic home searches incident to arrest, serves to enhance privacy
protections against these nonvehicular searches that have become police
entitlements.18
Part I outlines the judicial origin of search incident to arrest law and its
schizophrenic history. This Part will also expose the fundamental conflict
between the cases and discuss the legal rules and reasoning of Gant. Part II
argues that the standard governing Gant’s second holding is vague, and is
concerned with whether the crime of arrest involves tangible evidence
rather than a quantum of proof analysis prevalent in standards such as
probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Part III analyzes the effect of
applying Gant’s first holding to an automatic search of containers on the
person incident to arrest, while Part IV applies Gant to certain automatic
home searches incident to arrest.
Part IV also addresses some
counterarguments and potential pitfalls. This Comment concludes that
Gant’s retraction of the search incident to arrest power may serve to end, or
at the least severely undermine, automatic searches of containers on the
person and homes incident to arrest.
I.

INTRODUCING THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION AND
GAT

In numerous opinions, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment to require a warrant for a search.19 Nevertheless, the general
15. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (rejecting a rule permitting automatic vehicle searches
because such a rule cannot be justified by the twin rationales of officer safety and
preservation of evidence as established by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
16. See cases cited supra note 14 (providing examples of nonvehicular cases in which
courts have allowed automatic searches).
17. For purposes of this Comment, containers on the person include containers found in
a search of an arrestee’s clothing, such as a cigarette pack. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.
Containers on the person also include purses, backpacks, and other containers “immediately
associated,” or somehow connected to, the individual. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 15 (1977). Courts have used Robinson and Belton to support automatic searches of
personal bags and briefcases. See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 923 F.2d 621 (8th Cir.
1991) (bags); United States v. Herrera, 810 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1987) (briefcase).
18. See United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1003 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
(suppressing evidence from a home search by applying Gant); United States v. Perdoma,
No. 8:08cr00460, 2009 WL 1490595, at *2 (D. Neb. May 22, 2009) (applying Gant to a
search of a nonvehicular arrestee’s bag).
19. See, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761 (stating that the Fourth Amendment requires a
magistrate to assess the legal justification of a search before it takes place); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that warrantless searches are unreasonable per se
and are “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”);
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rule that a warrantless search is unconstitutional has been significantly
weakened by a plethora of exceptions that have greatly expanded the power
of police to conduct warrantless searches.20 One such exception is a search
incident to arrest.21 The history of search incident to arrest law is often
contradictory as the Supreme Court has variously expanded and retracted
police authority to conduct such a search.22
A. Origins of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception
The Court first recognized search incident to arrest power in dictum in
Weeks v. United States23 and subsequent cases drew from Weeks to further
establish this law enforcement “right” to search.24 After rapid expansion
and contraction of the search incident to arrest authority,25 the Court settled
on an expansive search power in United States v. Rabinowitz.26
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357) (holding that
it is a “cardinal principle” that warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment”). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 762–63 (1994) (discussing the warrant requirement and
its variants).
20. E.g., Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (listing certain emergencies, such
as hot pursuit of a felon, that would allow a warrantless entry of a home); Chimel, 395 U.S.
at 755–60 (tracing the history of the search incident to arrest exception); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (permitting a limited warrantless pat-down search for reasons of officer
safety); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966) (permitting a warrantless
search based on the exigency of the destruction of evidence); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 161 (1925) (creating the automobile exception and upholding a warrantless
automobile search supported by probable cause); see also Edwin Butterfoss, As Time Goes
By: The Elimination of Contemporaneity and Brevity as Factors in Search and Seizure
Cases, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 603, 604 (1986) [hereinafter As Time Goes By] (arguing
that expansions of various exceptions to the warrant requirement have diminished the
protection of the Fourth Amendment).
21. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that a search incident to arrest is not the government’s right, but an exception
that is only justified by certain necessities).
22. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1419 (analogizing the shrinking and expanding of
search incident authority to a pendulum swinging back and forth).
23. See 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (recognizing the “right on the part of the government
. . . to search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits
or evidences of crime”).
24. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging the flaws of relying on Weeks to establish search incident to arrest authority
by stating that such power was “loosely turned into dictum and finally elevated to a
decision”). See generally Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1421–26 (discussing the origins of
the exception).
25. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1423–26 (describing the rapid and unpredictable
expansions and contractions of the search incident to arrest exception); see also Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. at 67 (Black, J., dissenting) (lamenting the uncertainty regarding the scope of the
search incident to arrest power in preceding years). For example, the Court in Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), articulated a broad authority by upholding a search of
an entire apartment incident to arrest, whereas the Court reversed course the next year in
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), by insisting that the search incident to arrest
power must be strictly limited. Almost twenty years later, the Court returned to Harris only
to limit the search incident power in Chimel. The Court proceeded to expand this power
after Chimel only to rein it back in Gant. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1427 n.66 (noting
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The Rabinowitz Court upheld the search of a home based on law
enforcement’s interest in discovering evidence of the crime of arrest,27 in
this case, stamp forgery, and determined that Fourth Amendment
adjudication should not be governed by a general warrant requirement, but
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the search was reasonable.28
Rabinowitz remained good law for nineteen years until the Court took a
dramatic turn and rejected Rabinowitz’s broad search authority, which was
premised on law enforcement’s need to discover evidence.
In Chimel v. California,29 the defendant was arrested in his home,
pursuant to an arrest warrant, for burglarizing a coin shop.30 Subsequently,
the officers searched the entire house over the objection of arrestee Chimel,
and ordered his wife to open drawers located in the master bedroom.31 The
Court held that this search violated the Fourth Amendment and established
a new rule to govern searches incident to arrest.32 Overruling Rabinowitz,33
the Court stated that a search incident to arrest may only extend to the area
within the arrestee’s immediate control, or reaching distance, from where
she might obtain a weapon or destructible evidence.34 These twin
rationales, officer safety and preservation of evidence, underpin the
authority to search within the arrestee’s reaching area.35
The Court reasoned that warrantless searches, like in Rabinowitz,
generally contradict the original purpose of the Fourth Amendment: to
guard against warrantless searches and general warrant searches, like the
British conducted of the colonists’ homes.36 The Chimel Court emphasized
that the more than thirty-five years since Chimel was decided had been marked by an
expansion of search incident to arrest authority).
26. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
27. See id. at 65 (permitting a warrantless home search for the purpose of discovering
evidence, as opposed to another rationale such as officer safety); see also Thornton v.
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the Rabinowitz
Court relied on the interest in gathering evidence to uphold a warrantless search of a home).
28. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 66 (“The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn
depends upon the facts and circumstances—the total atmosphere of the case.”).
29. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
30. Id. at 753.
31. Id. at 754.
32. Id. at 768.
33. See id. (overruling Rabinowitz to the extent that it is inconsistent with the Chimel
rule).
34. Id. at 763. The area of immediate control is also known as the “lunge area.” Leslie
A. Lunney, The (Inevitably Arbitrary) Placement of Bright Lines: Belton and Its Progeny,
79 TUL. L. REV. 365, 396 (2004). Furthermore, the rationales underpinning the search,
officer safety and the preservation of evidence, are often referred to as Chimel’s twin
rationales. E.g., Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1417.
35. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763; see also As Time Goes By, supra note 20, at 604 (citing
cases requiring warrant exceptions to be “narrowly tailored to the circumstances that justify
their creation”); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1428 (stating that the majority’s belief in the
warrant requirement lead it to limit warrant exceptions to specific rationales).
36. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760–61.
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the importance of obtaining a warrant before a search and therefore
restricted the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement
to the reaching area, justified by the twin rationales of officer safety and
preservation of evidence.37
A possible explanation for the difference in outcomes between
Rabinowitz and Chimel is that the cases fundamentally differ on whether
the Fourth Amendment presumes a warrantless search to be
impermissible.38 The Chimel Court believed that the Fourth Amendment
generally required a warrant for a search,39 and that any exception would
have to be narrow in scope and strictly tied to the rationales that justify the
exception.40 On the other hand, the Rabinowitz Court did not believe in the
warrant presumption, and was guided by the reasonableness clause of the
Fourth Amendment where the permissibility of searches must be
determined by a general reasonableness standard.41
B. The Emergence of Bright-Line Rules
While Chimel firmly established the rationales for the search incident to
arrest exception, the Court four years later permitted an automatic search of
the person and containers on the person incident to arrest in United States
v. Robinson.42 In Robinson, the defendant was lawfully arrested for driving
with a revoked license.43 Upon patting down Robinson, the officer felt a
crumpled cigarette pack in his coat pocket and removed it.44 The officer
felt that its contents were not cigarettes, and opened it to discover fourteen
37. See id. at 763 (stating that no justification comparable to the twin rationales exists
to support a warrantless search of a home incident to arrest). Note that the preservation of
evidence rationale seeks to prevent the arrestee from obtaining and destroying evidence
upon arrest whereas the discovery of evidence rationale, as upheld in Rabinowitz, relates to
searches for evidence of crime even when the arrestee cannot reach destructible evidence.
38. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 224–25 (3d ed.
2002) (noting that the holdings in both Chimel and Robinson result from differing Fourth
Amendment analyses since the Chimel Court was concerned about the scope of a warrant
exception whereas the Robinson Court de-emphasized the warrant requirement). Compare
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (rejecting a per se warrant requirement
and supporting a general reasonableness approach to Fourth Amendment adjudication), with
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764–65 (asserting that a general reasonableness standard is devoid of
meaning and the reasonableness argument is founded on a “subjective view regarding the
acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct”).
39. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761 (“In the scheme of the Amendment, therefore, the
requirement that ‘no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,’ plays a crucial part.”
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
40. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761–62; see also As Time Goes By, supra note 20, at 604
(arguing that warrant exceptions must be strictly confined to the rationales that justify their
existence).
41. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 65–66; see also Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1425
(discussing Rabinowitz’s rejection of a rule requiring warrants whenever practicable).
42. 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
43. Id. at 220.
44. Id. at 222–23.
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heroin capsules.45 The Court stated that the search of Robinson’s person
and the cigarette pack were constitutional based on reasons of officer safety
and discovery of evidence.46 Despite these reasons, Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, held that a lawful arrest provides the authority to
search and that a search of a person incident to a lawful arrest needs no
further justification.47 The Court also stated that a “more fundamental”
reason for upholding the search is that precedent does not support a caseby-case adjudication of the lawfulness of the search of a person incident to
arrest.48 In other words, the Court created the power of an automatic search
by virtue of an arrest, irrespective of whether the arrestee could possibly
reach into the container to grab a weapon to harm the officer or destroy
evidence.49
Not only did the Court establish a bright-line rule permitting automatic
searches of a person and containers on a person incident to arrest, but later
also upheld automatic searches in the home context. For example, the
Court in Maryland v. Buie50 held that upon arrest, police may search closets
and other areas “immediately adjoining the place of arrest” from where a
person may attack.51 The basis for this so-called protective sweep is officer
safety; however, the Court held that no rationale is needed to conduct the
automatic sweep, not even an officer’s subjective belief that there may be a
hiding person who presents a danger to officer safety.52
Another case that created an automatic search power incident to arrest in
the home is United States v. Turner.53 In Turner, police obtained an arrest
warrant for Turner for distributing crack cocaine and possessing a firearm
while committing a drug crime.54 The officers forced their way into the
apartment and discovered Turner in bed with a woman and a revolver by
his side.55 Turner was handcuffed and taken into the other room for officer

45. Id. at 223.
46. Id. at 235.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1432 (arguing that a Robinson search of a
person incident to arrest does not require a danger that the arrestee might harm the officer or
obtain destructible evidence).
49. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (holding that it is the fact of a lawful arrest that
provides the authority to search); see also Kelly A. Deters, Note, The “Evaporation Point”:
State v. Sykes and the Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Through the Search-Incident-toArrest Exception, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1901, 1913 (2007) (arguing that Robinson permits a
search irrespective of the twin rationales and therefore violates privacy protections as it
allows a warrantless search when there is no exigency to justify it).
50. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
51. Id. at 334.
52. See id. (allowing a search of closets and spaces immediately adjoining arrest
without requiring probable cause or reasonable suspicion).
53. 926 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1991).
54. Id. at 885.
55. Id. at 886.
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safety.56 With Turner detained in the adjacent room, the officers searched
the room of arrest and found firearms and crack cocaine.57 The Ninth
Circuit upheld the search, determining that the contraband was within
Turner’s immediate control when he was arrested, and asserting that it was
of no consequence that he was not within reaching distance at the time of
the search.58 While claiming consistency with Chimel, the court in Turner
did not apply Chimel’s essential logic because the arrestee in Turner was
handcuffed, under the control of the police, and not in reaching distance of
the searched area at the time of the search was conducted.59
Consistent with its historical vacillations on the scope of searches
incident to arrest, the Supreme Court sharply broke from Chimel in ew
York v. Belton.60 In Belton, an officer stopped a car for speeding and upon
smelling marijuana and observing an envelope marked “Supergold,” which
he associated with the drug, ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle.61
The officer then arrested the car’s occupants for possession of marijuana
and searched the car incident to the arrest, finding marijuana in the
envelope and cocaine in Belton’s jacket, which was inside the car.62 The
Court announced that Chimel was difficult to apply to automobiles because
lower courts were confused on whether Chimel permitted a search of the
vehicle after its occupants were no longer inside it.63 Stressing the
importance of providing law enforcement with a clear, bright-line rule, the
Court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.”64 The Court
looked favorably upon the bright-line rule Robinson created, providing
56. Id. at 888.
57. Id. at 886.
58. See id. at 887–88 (adopting the Seventh Circuit approach by asking whether the
evidence or weapons were within the immediate control of the arrestee at the time of arrest,
and whether any events between the arrest and search made the search unreasonable).
59. Compare Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding that officers may
search, incident to arrest, the area where an arrestee might gain access to weapons or
destructible evidence), with Turner, 926 F.2d at 888 (upholding a search of a room when the
arrestee was not in reaching distance by analyzing whether the arrestee was in reach of
weapons or destructible evidence at the time of arrest, as opposed to the time of the search).
60. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
61. Id. at 455–56.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 459; see also Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Chimel’s rule is difficult for officers to apply in the field).
64. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. Courts have required, at least in theory, that the search
must be contemporaneous, or at least substantially contemporaneous, to an arrest in order
for it to be incident to that arrest. The contemporaneity requirement is essential if the search
is to qualify as incident to arrest. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)
(holding that a search of a footlocker more than an hour after an arrest was not
contemporaneous and thus not a search incident to arrest); Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (holding that a search conducted after an arrest and in a location
beyond that of the arrest cannot fall under search incident to arrest doctrine).
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officers the authority to search a person, and his containers, incident to
arrest as a matter of right, and lamented that such a clear rule had not
emerged in the vehicular context.65
In his Belton dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that the majority
created a bright-line rule authorizing automatic searches that disregarded
Chimel’s twin rationales.66 In order to maintain the illusion that it was
applying Chimel to the present facts, the Court created a legal fiction which
presumes that arrestees are generally within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment of the vehicle, thereby automatically triggering
Chimel’s twin rationales to justify a search.67
The Court revisited Belton in Thornton v. United States,68 where it
upheld a search of a recent occupant of a vehicle who had alighted from the
vehicle just before arrest.69 The majority upheld the search even though
Thornton was handcuffed and placed in the squad car before the search,
thereby affirming Belton’s bright-line rule.70
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to present
his differing approach to searches of vehicles incident to arrest.71 He
rejected Belton’s legal fiction and asserted that the risk of Thornton
escaping from the squad car, in handcuffs, to retrieve a weapon or evidence
from his car was “remote in the extreme.”72 In asserting that such
warrantless searches are exceptions to a warrant requirement, rather than
police entitlements,73 Justice Scalia’s concurrence affirmed Chimel and
65. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459 (noting that Robinson rejected the argument that
searches of persons incident to arrest must be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis and that
lower courts have had difficulty in individual adjudication of searches of automobiles
incident to arrest).
66. See id. at 464–65 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority had created
an arbitrary bright-line rule that disregarded the policy reasons underlying Chimel’s
holding).
67. See id. at 460 (majority opinion) (creating “the generalization that articles inside the
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact
generally, even if not inevitably, within” the immediate control of the arrestee); see also
Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel
and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657, 674 (2002) [hereinafter An Empirical Reexamination]
(arguing that Belton’s legal fiction is wrong in light of routine police procedures that secure
and remove the arrestee from the car); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1434 (stating that Belton
created a legal fiction that a recent occupant who is no longer in the vehicle can gain access
to weapons or destructible evidence within the vehicle).
68. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
69. Id. at 623–24.
70. Id. at 623.
71. See id. at 625–32 (Scalia, J., concurring) (delineating his opposing view on search
incident to arrest doctrine).
72. Id. at 625. Justice Scalia recognized that, by creating a rule where an arrestee is
presumed to always be able to access the vehicle, Belton created a “mythical
arrestee ‘possessed of the skill of Houdini and the strength of Hercules.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973)).
73. See id. at 627 (“[C]onducting a Chimel search is not the Government’s right; it is an
exception—justified by necessity—to a rule that would otherwise render the search
unlawful.”).
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expressed concern that pretextual arrests allowed officers to rummage
through an individual’s personal property.74 However, Justice Scalia
continued that even when the arrestee is not within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment of the vehicle, he would nevertheless permit a
search if it were “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest might be found in the vehicle.”75
Justice Scalia based this rule upon the evidence-gathering rationale from
cases such as Rabinowitz,76 but did not acknowledge that Chimel overruled
Rabinowitz.77 He also justified his rule by reasoning that permitting such a
vehicular search is not rummaging, presumably because an officer would
be searching for evidence of the crime of arrest as opposed to conducting a
general automobile search in order to discover some other criminal
evidence.78
C. Gant’s Retraction of Search Incident to Arrest Power
Justice Scalia’s approach became law in Arizona v. Gant.79 In Gant,
Tucson police officers discovered an arrest warrant for Rodney Gant, for
driving with a suspended license, during a drug trafficking investigation.80
The officers arrested, handcuffed, and placed Gant in a squad car before
conducting a Belton search of his vehicle, whereupon they uncovered a gun
and cocaine.81 Without expressly overruling Belton, the Court rejected
what it deemed to be a broad reading of that case, which granted automatic
search power, by reasoning that such an interpretation contradicts Chimel’s
twin rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence.82
The Court affirmed Chimel’s rule by asserting that it only allows a
search of the passenger compartment of a car when the arrestee is
“unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search.”83 The Court found that Belton violated Chimel’s
74. See id. at 627–29 (arguing that searches cannot merely be exploratory; police
officers must have an objective or reason for the search).
75. Id. at 632.
76. See id. at 630 (“There is nothing irrational about broader police authority to search
for evidence when and where the perpetrator of a crime is lawfully arrested.”).
77. Id. at 629.
78. See id. at 630 (stating that searching for a evidence of a specific crime incident to
arrest is not “general rummaging”).
79. 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009). The Court stated:
Consistent with the holding in Thornton v. United States . . . and following the
suggestion in Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment in that case . . .
we also conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a
search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the
offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Id.
80. Id. at 1714–15.
81. Id. at 1715.
82. Id. at 1719.
83. Id.
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core principles, including Chimel’s holding that a warrantless search
exception to the warrant requirement must be strictly linked to its
rationales.84 Because Rodney Gant was handcuffed and inside the police
cruiser, his ability to retrieve a weapon or evidence from his car was
nonexistent.85 Therefore, the Court held that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment because the rationales underlying the search incident to arrest
exception were lacking.86
In Gant, the Court affirmed Chimel, but also adopted Justice Scalia’s
novel approach from Thornton that when the arrestee is not within reaching
distance of the vehicle, a search is still permissible if it is reasonable to
believe that evidence of the crime of arrest might be found in the
automobile.87 The Court expressly limited this second holding to the
automobile context by stating that “circumstances unique” to this context
justify a search for evidence of the crime of arrest.88
As in Justice Scalia’s Thornton concurrence, the Court was concerned
about the power of police to rummage among an individual’s private
property89 and declared that an interpretation of Belton that gave police the
right to automatically search is “anathema to the Fourth Amendment.”90
Furthermore, the fact that Belton and Thornton permitted automatic
searches of an arrestee’s car, even for those arrested for mere traffic
violations, deeply concerned the Court.91
Notably, Justice Scalia concurred with the majority, rather than joining
its opinion, even though the Court essentially adopted his Thornton
concurrence.92 In his Gant concurrence, Justice Scalia expressed a
dissatisfaction with Chimel that he did not express in Thornton: that
Chimel fails to give appropriate guidelines to arresting officers given the
ambiguity in what constitutes an arrestee’s reaching distance.93 He argued
that Chimel “leaves much room for manipulation, inviting officers to leave
the scene unsecured (at least where dangerous suspects are not involved) in
84. See id. at 1716 (“[Chimel’s] limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of
the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its
purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of
arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.”).
85. See id. at 1719 (acknowledging that Gant “was not within reaching distance of his
car at the time of the search”).
86. See id. at 1716 (declaring the search unreasonable because Gant was not within
reaching distance of his car, and no evidence of the crime of arrest, driving with a suspended
license, could logically exist).
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
(holding that Gant’s evidentiary holding is limited to the vehicular context).
89. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720.
90. Id. at 1721.
91. See id. at 1722–23 (noting that these cases resulted in numerous constitutional right
violations of those who were guilty of mere traffic violations).
92. Id. at 1724–25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1724.

SINGH_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

STEPPING OUT OF THE VEHICLE

9/3/2010 10:48 AM

1771

order to conduct a vehicle search.”94 Interestingly, Justice Scalia dismissed
this perverse incentive argument in Thornton by arguing that if officers do
not follow safe procedures by failing to secure or remove an arrestee from
the scene of the arrest, then the search would automatically be
unconstitutional.95 Justice Scalia’s latest position, reflected in his Gant
concurrence, is that a search incident to arrest is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment “only when the object of the search is evidence of the
crime for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer
has probable cause to believe occurred.”96 Justice Scalia reasoned that
since Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, a
nonevidentiary crime where a search incident to arrest could not possibly
discover evidence of the crime, and since no probable cause of another
crime existed, the search was unreasonable.97
While the Court clearly abolished Belton’s legal fiction by affirming
Chimel’s twin rationales, it left unclear what exactly the “reasonable to
believe” standard entails.98
II. GAT’S REASONABLE TO BELIEVE STANDARD PERTAINS TO THE
EVIDENTIARY NATURE OF THE CRIME
By adopting Justice Scalia’s approach from Thornton, the Court opted
for a reasonable to believe standard that varies from the familiar standards
of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.99 However, the Court was not
explicit about what such a standard entails and failed to define it.100 A
94. Id. at 1724–25.
95. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004). Justice Scalia asserted
that “if an officer leaves a suspect unrestrained nearby just to manufacture authority to
search, one could argue that the search is unreasonable precisely because the dangerous
conditions justifying it existed only by virtue of the officer’s failure to follow sensible
procedures.” Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1723–24 (holding that a search incident to arrest is unconstitutional where
Chimel’s twin rationales are absent, or where it is not reasonable to believe that evidence of
the crime of arrest could be found in the vehicle).
99. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 7.1(d), at 109 (4th ed. Supp. 2009) (noting that the adoption of this standard
was a “dramatic change in the law”); Rudstein, supra note 11, at 1345 (arguing that
reasonable to believe is not probable cause); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1464 (same); Orin
Kerr,
When
Is
It
“Reasonable
to
Believe”
That
Evidence
Relevant to An Offense is In A Car? Does that Require Probable Cause, Reasonable
Suspicion, or Something Else?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Apr. 22, 2009,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_04_19-2009_04_25.shtml#1240453456
(recognizing the uncertainty associated with a reasonable to believe standard); see also
Dripps, supra note 5, at 404 (contending that reasonable to believe is a vague standard less
than probable cause, and that the Court might eventually equate it with reasonable
suspicion).
100. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1729 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is unclear when
the reasonable to believe standard will permit a search); see also LAFAVE, supra note 99, §
7.1(d), at 111 (observing that Gant provided only an “adumbrated treatment” of the
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logical place to seek guidance about this standard’s meaning is Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Thornton because the Court in Gant expressly
adopted the standard from this concurrence.101 Unfortunately, Justice
Scalia’s Thornton concurrence does not provide a definition of the standard
either, leaving lower courts, police officers, and commentators to guess at
its precise meaning.102
Other cases have articulated a standard such as reasonable to believe, or
reason to believe, but they too provide little guidance.103 Adding to the
confusion, various cases have equated the reasonable to believe, or
reasonable belief, standard with either reasonable suspicion104 or probable
cause.105 Nevertheless, this standard is not equivalent to probable cause
because the automobile exception already provides for warrantless vehicle
searches based solely on probable cause.106 The automobile exception
pertains to car searches before107 or after an arrest,108 rather than a
standard).
101. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (adopting the reasonable to believe standard by
directly quoting Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Thornton).
102. See id. at 1726 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the new standard will confuse
police officers and judges); Kerr, supra note 99 (determining that Justice Scalia’s Thornton
concurrence, and other cases, provide little guidance regarding the meaning of “reasonable
to believe,” leaving the author unsure of the standard’s definition); see also Kit Kinports,
Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 649, 657
(2009) (arguing that undefined standards such as reasonable to believe should be adopted, if
at all, with transparency and better guidance).
103. E.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) (allowing a warrantless
home entry if there is an “objectively reasonable basis” that a house occupant is severely
injured, without elaborating on the standard); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (articulating a reasonable to believe standard without
elaborating on its contours); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980) (upholding
entrance into a home with an arrest warrant where “there is reason to believe the suspect is
within”); see also Kinports, supra note 102, at 649 (stating that the Court has used language
such as “reason[able] to believe” without definition or explanation of its relationship to
reasonable suspicion or probable cause).
104. E.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (upholding protective house
sweeps based on reasonable suspicion and requiring that the police have “a reasonable
belief” that an attacker is hiding in the area swept); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27 (1968)
(stating that an officer may frisk a suspect if he has a reasonable, articulable suspicion, or a
“reason to believe” the suspect is armed and dangerous).
105. E.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (proclaiming that the substance
of probable cause is a “reasonable ground for belief of guilt”) (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 233 n.7 (1983) (describing probable cause to arrest as a “reasonable belief” that
the arrestee had committed a crime).
106. Kinports, supra note 102, at 651; LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(d), at 110–11. See
generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155–56 (1925) (holding that a warrantless
automobile search supported by probable cause of a crime is lawful).
107. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155–56 (upholding the search and seizure of contraband
liquor upon probable cause, which then led to arrest); see also California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386, 395 (1985) (upholding a warrantless search of a mobile home before arrest based
on the automobile exception).
108. E.g., United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487–88 (1985) (holding that a car search
conducted three days after the arrest of a driver and seizure of his car was reasonable);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47 (1970) (permitting a car search based on the
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substantially contemporaneous search incident to arrest, so that the two
doctrines of search incident to arrest and the automobile exception would
blend into each other if probable cause were equated with Gant’s
reasonable to believe standard. Since equating reasonable to believe with
probable cause would be redundant in light of the preexisting automobile
exception, it is unlikely that the Court intended to equate the two
standards.109
Furthermore, it is also unlikely that the Court intended to equate this
standard with reasonable suspicion. In abolishing the bright-line Belton
rule, the Court found that ample authority exists to search a car for reasons
of officer safety.110 Justice Stevens acknowledged that Michigan v. Long111
permits a search of a vehicle if there is reasonable suspicion that an
occupant is dangerous and might grab a weapon,112 and noted that the Court
similarly permitted a protective sweep of a house in Buie based on
reasonable suspicion.113 These cases reflect the general rule that reasonable
suspicion can only support limited searches for officer safety.114 By
discussing such cases, the Court in Gant impliedly acknowledged that
reasonable suspicion is limited to searches based on officer safety and that
an evidentiary search cannot be based on that standard.115 It is also
unlikely that reasonable to believe is a standard lower than reasonable
suspicion since the latter standard is already extremely low.116 If
automobile exception after the car and the arrestee had been taken to the police station).
109. LAFAVE, supra note 99, at § 7.1(d); Bright Line, supra note 4, at 98 n.139.
110. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (discussing the established
authority to search, not incident to arrest, but for officer safety).
111. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
112. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721 (2009) (rejecting a broad reading of Belton because,
inter alia, officer safety is already addressed in settled case law).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that an officer may conduct
a pat-down search only when there is reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect is
armed and dangerous).
115. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721 (analyzing cases permitting searches based on
reasonable suspicion for officer safety reasons, but not for evidentiary reasons). But see
Myron Moskovitz, The Road to Reason: Arizona v. Gant and the Search Incident to Arrest
Doctrine, 79 MISS. L.J. 181, 193–94 (2009) [hereinafter The Road to Reason] (predicting
that courts will equate reasonable to believe with reasonable suspicion).
116. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (stating that reasonable suspicion
is “considerably” lower than preponderance of the evidence and is less demanding than
probable cause); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (discussing reasonable
suspicion as a standard that requires only “some minimal level of objective justification,”
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted), supported by facts
rather than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217
(1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It can be argued that the reasonable to believe
standard is no different from the reasonable suspicion standard because both share the
requirement of reasonability. See Kinports, supra note 102, at 651 (observing that phrases
such as reasonable to believe are linguistically similar to reasonable suspicion). However,
as discussed in the text, the Gant Court probably did not intend to equate the two standards
since it did not analyze reasonable suspicion cases in light of the reasonable to believe
standard, which is used for searches due to officer safety alone, rather than an evidentiary
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reasonable to believe is a standard lower than probable cause, but not lower
than reasonable suspicion, it might be an intermediate standard, albeit one
whose contours are unknown.117
More likely still is that the standard asks whether the crime of arrest was
an evidentiary crime, rather than entailing a quantum of proof, as do
reasonable suspicion and probable cause.118 Because the crime of arrest in
Gant was not evidentiary—no further evidence of driving without a license
could exist beyond the warrant for Gant’s arrest—a search of the car would
be unreasonable under Gant’s second holding.119 On the other hand, if the
warrant listed distribution of illegal drugs as the crime, the evidentiary
nature of the crime would likely justify the search. This “nature of the
offense” test finds support in the Gant opinion as the Court claimed that,
“[i]n many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic
violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains
relevant evidence.”120 The Court stated that in other cases, such as Belton
and Thornton, where the arrestees were arrested for possession of illegal
drugs, it would be reasonable to search the car incident to arrest.121
Nevertheless, it is uncertain what exactly the Court intended the standard
to entail, and its definition will likely be heavily litigated.122 Such
obfuscation on behalf of the Supreme Court bodes ill for lower courts that
are left with little guidance in applying the standard.123

rationale.
117. See Kinports, supra note 102, at 660 (arguing that phrases akin to reasonable to
believe may lead to a sliding scale of standards, as opposed to the current reasonable
suspicion/probable cause dichotomy). But see Kerr, supra note 99 (“My best guess is that
‘reasonable to believe’ is the sort of undefined reasonableness used by most lower courts in
the Payton setting.”) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir.
2005)).
118. See LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(d), at 111–12 (stating that the author’s “hunch” is
that the standard is a “nature-of-the-offense test”); see also United States v. Chavez, No.
2:09-cr-0033 FCD, 2009 WL 4282111, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov 24, 2009) (disallowing a search
incident to arrest under Gant’s second holding because it is not reasonable to believe that
evidence of a battery would be found within the car); People v. Osborne, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d
696, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (permitting a search under Gant’s second holding because
gun possession was an evidentiary crime akin to possession of illicit drugs); Hermele, supra
note 13, at 186 (stating that Gant’s second holding pertains to evidentiary crimes).
119. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Dale Anderson & Dave Cole, Search and Seizure After Arizona v. Gant, 46 ARIZ.
ATT’Y 14, 16 (2009) (stating that the definition of reasonable to believe is “anybody’s
guess” and will require lower courts to define it); Timothy H. Everett, Arizona v. Gant: The
End of the Belton Rule as we Knew It, 33 CHAMPION 58, 58–59 (Aug. 2009) (noting that the
Court did not articulate the standard’s relation to reasonable suspicion or probable cause and
that this issue will be heavily litigated before reappearing at the Supreme Court).
123. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1726 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the new standard
will confuse police officers and judges); cf. Kinports, supra note 102, at 650–53 (discussing
the confusion arising from phrases resembling reasonable to believe).
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III. GAT’S POTENTIAL TO END AUTOMATIC SEARCHES OF CONTAINERS
ON THE PERSON INCIDENT TO ARREST
Gant’s immediate effect is to terminate automatic searches incident to
arrest in the vehicular context.124 The police no longer have the power, as a
matter of right granted in Belton and extended in Thornton, to
automatically search a vehicle based solely on an arrest.125 Nevertheless,
automatic searches incident to arrest in nonvehicular contexts continue to
persist.126 Gant abrogated cases such as Robinson, Turner, and Buie by
terminating automatic searches incident to arrest in the vehicle context.127
The Court severely undermined the concept that the police may search
incident to arrest as a matter of right.128
A. Strengthening Chimel Beyond the Vehicular Context
Gant abrogated such a police entitlement by re-anchoring the search
incident to arrest exception to the twin rationales of Chimel.129 Moreover,
the Gant Court strengthened Chimel by stating that not only must the
arrestee be within reaching distance to justify a search, but that he also
must be unsecured.130 Chimel did not analyze whether the arrestee must be
unsecured for police to justifiably search the arrestee’s alleged reaching
distance, and the opinion omitted the important detail of whether petitioner
Chimel was handcuffed or otherwise secured when the police searched his
home.131
Nevertheless, under Chimel’s logic, it seems that if an arrestee is secured
in handcuffs, his ability to retrieve a weapon or destructible evidence from
his surrounding area is virtually nonexistent.132 While the text of Chimel is
not immediately clear whether a search is permissible when an arrestee is
handcuffed, the logic driving the opinion would likely deny a search in
124. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It must be borne in mind that
we are speaking here only of a rule automatically permitting a search when the driver or an
occupant is arrested.”); Everett, supra note 122, at 58–59; see also Anderson & Cole, supra
note 122, at 14 (noting that Gant ends “free” searches of cars incident to arrest).
125. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (rejecting a broad reading of Belton that would violate
Chimel).
126. See supra note 14 (listing cases in the personal container and home context where
automatic searches incident to arrest persist).
127. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720 (asserting that automatic Belton searches are a serious
threat to privacy).
128. See id. at 1721 (stating that allowing automatic warrantless searches as a police
entitlement is “anathema to the Fourth Amendment”).
129. Id. at 1719.
130. See id. (holding that a search of the passenger compartment of a car is constitutional
under Chimel when the arrestee is both unsecured and within reaching distance).
131. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753 (1969) (stating only that officers
arrested Chimel by handing him an arrest warrant).
132. See id. at 762–63 (explaining that a search is reasonable upon arrest if the suspect is
able to grab a weapon or destructible evidence).
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such circumstances since the area surrounding the arrestee would not be in
his immediate control.133 It seems unlikely that a handcuffed arrestee could
grab a gun from a cabinet, or drugs from a closed container.134 If the area
around the arrestee is not within his immediate control, then the twin
rationales are not present, as the arrestee cannot reach a weapon with which
to harm officers or grab evidence to destroy.135
By holding that a vehicle search is permissible under Chimel only if the
arrestee is within reaching distance and unsecured, the Court in Gant
recognizes that a handcuffed, or otherwise secured arrestee, has little
opportunity to obtain weapons or destructible evidence.136
This
acknowledgement is evident when the Court claims, “[i]f there is no
possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement
officers seek to search, both justifications for the search incident to arrest
exception are absent and the rule does not apply.”137 Gant’s first holding
does not imply that the only situation where an arrestee cannot reach into
an area officers desire to search is when the arrestee is far removed from
that area.138
This holding, then, must include situations where the arrestee is
adequately secured, so as to render his ability to reach the area the police
seek to search a virtual impossibility.139 For example, an unhandcuffed
arrestee who is surrounded by multiple officers may be adequately
secured.140
In sum, Gant’s first holding permits officers to search an area incident to
arrest, other than the person himself, when the arrestee may realistically
access that area.141 This possibility of access is only present when the
arrestee is not secured and within reaching distance of the space officers
133. See id. at 763 (allowing a search of the area within an arrestee’s immediate control
by providing the example of the comparable danger of a gun on a table versus one in a
drawer); An Empirical Reexamination, supra note 67, at 662 (2002) (arguing that Chimel’s
rule allows a search under an assumption that the arrestee is unrestrained).
134. Cf. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (acknowledging that an arrestee cannot access his
vehicle when restrained). But see United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1990)
(upholding a search of a cabinet after handcuffing arrestee); United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d
840, 847 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding a search valid after arrestees were handcuffed and
monitored by agents).
135. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
136. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (elaborating on Chimel’s rule to bar a vehicle search
when the arrestee is secured).
137. Id. at 1716.
138. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that if the arrestee is in
handcuffs, the possibility that he will be able to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence is
extremely low).
139. See LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(c) at 104 (“The connector ‘and’ is especially
significant here, for it tells us that the fact the arrestee is ‘unsecured’ is not good enough if
he is not also ‘within reaching distance,’ just as being that close is not good enough if that
arrestee has been secured.”).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 5.5(a), at 43.
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seek to search.142 The Court not only affirmed Chimel, but has also
reinvigorated its rule by using Chimel’s internal logic to hold that a secured
arrestee cannot reach the surrounding area for weapons or evidence.143
Notably, the Court did not limit its elaboration of Chimel to the vehicular
context. When it discussed Chimel, the Court in Gant did not qualify its
language with phrases such as “in the vehicle context” or use other words
that would confine its Chimel analysis to the automobile sphere.144 To the
contrary, the language used to discuss Chimel is broad. The Gant Court’s
use of broad language in its discussion of Chimel leads to the inference that
the Court did not intend to limit its Chimel analysis to the automobile
context.145
In contrast, the Court expressly limited its second holding to the
vehicular context, allowing a search of a vehicle incident to arrest when it
is reasonable to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest could be
discovered.146 The Court failed to articulate what circumstances are unique
to the car context that warrant the adoption of this new evidentiary
exception, though rationales underpinning the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement are likely the unique circumstances that justify the
Court’s evidentiary holding.147
In Carroll v. United States,148 the Court allowed a search of a car, before
arrest, upon probable cause that contraband would be found inside.149 This
142. Id. § 6.3(c), at 60.
143. See id. (noting the relevance of Gant’s specification that “possibility of access” is
only necessary when the arrestee is unsecured and is within reaching distance).
144. Id.; see also LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 5.5(a), at 43 (discussing the two holdings in
Gant when a search is permissible and noting only the second is limited to the vehicle
context, and not the first “where there is ‘possibility of access’”).
145. See United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001−02 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
(applying Gant to a home search); United States v. Perdoma, No. 8:08CR460, 2009 WL
1490595, at *2 (D. Neb. May 22, 2009) (applying Gant to search of a personal container);
LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 5.5(a), at 43−44 (mentioning that Gant’s first holding may apply
to container and premises searches); Anderson & Cole, supra note 122, at 16, at 16
(predicting that courts will apply Gant to the home context); Craig M. Bradley, Two and a
Half Cheers for the Court, 45 TRIAL 48, 49 (Aug. 2009) (“Alito was correct when he
observed that Gant will lead to a reexamination of searches incident to arrest in the home
and will force courts to recognize that searches of areas near arrestees also may not be
justified once a suspect has been handcuffed or taken away.”) (emphasis added).
146. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (“Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also
conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a
lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might
be found in the vehicle.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 632 (2004)); see also Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (holding that Gant’s evidentiary
holding is confined to the vehicular context); LAFAVE, supra note 99, §5.5(a), at 43
(suggesting that Gant’s second holding is inapplicable beyond the vehicular context).
147. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985) (justifying the automobile
exception on a lower expectation of privacy within the automobile); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (holding that a warrantless automobile search supported by
probable cause of a crime is lawful due to the mobility inherent in an automobile).
148. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
149. Id. at 155.
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exception is distinct from the search incident to arrest exception, and the
Court justified this distinction based on the fact that cars are mobile and
can easily drive away if the police delay a search in an attempt to obtain a
search warrant.150 Another unique characteristic of vehicles to which Gant
is likely referring is the supposed lower expectation of privacy for
automobiles, which the Court also has used to justify the automobile
exception.151 Nowhere in the opinion, besides in relation to its second
holding, does the Court in Gant limit its Chimel analysis to the vehicular
context.152 Therefore, Gant’s robust affirmation of Chimel is applicable in
other contexts, such as searches of containers on the person as in
Robinson.153 Furthermore, the Court’s concern about automatic searches as
unjustified police entitlements supports the argument that Gant’s first
holding should be applied in other automatic, nonvehicular search incident
to arrest situations.154 In his Gant dissent, Justice Alito recognized that
Gant’s refinement of Chimel can apply to other instances, stating that
“there is no logical reason why the same rule should not apply to all
arrestees.”155
The Court’s powerful rhetoric against automatic searches as police
entitlements reflects a broader concern about the erosion of individual
privacy resulting from an overly broad search incident to arrest power.156
Since the Court felt that the Belton rule contravenes the primary purpose of
the Fourth Amendment—to prevent unfettered discretion to search within
150. Id. at 153. See generally As Time Goes By, supra note 20, at 606–11 (recognizing
Carroll as the origin of the automobile exception, and explaining the Carrol Court’s
concern with the impracticality of securing a warrant for an automobile search because of an
automobile’s mobility).
151. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (justifying the automobile exception by claiming that
one has a lower expectation of privacy in an automobile due to pervasive governmental
regulation).
152. See United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001−02 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
(explaining that, except for its second holding, the Gant decision is not strictly limited to the
automobile context).
153. See United States v. Perdoma, No. 8:08CR460, 2009 WL 1490595, at *2 (D. Neb.
May 22, 2009) (applying Gant to search of a personal container); LAFAVE, supra note 99, §
5.5(a), at 43–44 (arguing that Gant’s requirement of possibility of access, that is when the
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance, must be applied in all instances where
containers are searched incident to arrest).
154. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (stating that allowing automatic
warrantless searches as a police entitlement is “anathema to the Fourth Amendment”).
155. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1731 (Alito, J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 1720 (majority opinion) (expressing concern that the police power to
search incident to arrest for a crime where evidence cannot exist “creates a serious and
recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals” and that this threat “implicates the
central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the concern about giving police
officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects”); see also
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (claiming
that the search incident exception has become a police entitlement right rather than a
warrant requirement exception justified only by the rationales that justify its existence);
Everett, supra note 122, at 58 (asserting that the search incident to arrest exception since
Belton had become a police entitlement).
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the individual’s private sphere—then Gant calls into question other cases,
such as Robinson, where courts have upheld automatic searches as a matter
of right.157
B. Applying Gant to Robinson Prevents a Search of the Cigarette Pack
In Robinson, the defendant was arrested for the nonevidentiary offense
of driving with a revoked license,158 the same offense for which Gant was
arrested.159 Despite the nonevidentiary nature of the crime, the Court
upheld the search in Robinson for differing reasons, but essentially
determined that the power to search a person and containers on the person
incident to arrest is a matter of right and flows automatically from the arrest
itself.160 Robinson permits automatic searches of a person, and containers
on the person,161 incident to arrest and thereby stands in stark tension with
Chimel and the elaboration of its rule in Gant.162
Gant’s potential to end automatic searches of persons is less promising
than its potential to end automatic searches of containers on the person due
to courts’ emphasis on officer safety.163 Since a search of the arrestee’s
person could easily be justified under Chimel, given that an arrestee is
within reaching distance of a possible weapon or evidence upon his own
person, Chimel’s twin rationales would allow the search of a person
incident to arrest.164 Presumably, a search of the person would still be
lawful even if the arrest were for a nonevidentiary crime, since Chimel’s
officer safety rationale would still exist even absent the evidence
preservation rationale.165 The search of a person may also be permissible
under Gant’s affirmation of Chimel since a handcuffed arrestee might
157. See Bright Line, supra note 4, at 97–98 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s Thornton
approach abrogates cases upholding automatic searches incident to arrest in nonvehicular
contexts).
158. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 220 (1973).
159. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714.
160. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (holding that “[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest
which establishes the authority to search”).
161. See supra note 17.
162. See DRESSLER, supra note 38, at 224–25 (noting that the holdings in both Chimel
and Robinson result from differing Fourth Amendment analyses since the Chimel Court was
concerned about the scope of a warrant exception whereas the Robinson Court deemphasized the warrant requirement).
163. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333−34 (1990) (permitting officers to
search closets and spaces adjoining arrest to look for dangerous persons, without any level
of suspicion whatsoever); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (permitting a
search incident to arrest based on, inter alia, concerns for officers’ safety).
164. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63 (concluding that the search of a person is
reasonable based on rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence); see also
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35 (relying on, inter alia, officer safety and evidence
preservation to justify a search of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest).
165. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768 (holding that a search of an area beyond that within
which the arrestee can obtain weapons or something that could be used against him or her as
evidence is unreasonable).
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arguably be able to obtain a small weapon, such as a razor blade, or
destructible evidence from his pockets.
Nevertheless, Chimel does not discuss containers on the person, but
unlike Robinson, presumably does not allow automatic searches of
containers that are in the possession of the police.166 The Court in United
States v. Chadwick167 articulated this point in holding that a search of
arrestee’s property that is in the exclusive dominion and control of the
police is impermissible since the arrestee cannot access the property to
retrieve a weapon or evidence.168
In upholding the search of the cigarette pack in Robinson, the Court did
not discuss why the Fourth Amendment permits the police to automatically
search any container found on the person incident to arrest.169 This gap in
Robinson’s reasoning is where Gant could end automatic searches of
containers on the person incident to arrest. If the search of Robinson’s
person is permissible under Chimel, the search of the cigarette pack is
impermissible under the logic of Gant.170 When the officer searched the
cigarette pack, it was in the exclusive control of the officer, making it very
unlikely that Robinson could grab it to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence
inside the pack.171 Nevertheless, it is unclear from the text of the case
whether Robinson was handcuffed, and he arguably had the potential to
grab the pack from the officer if he was not secured.172 The question of
whether the arrestee was secured, however, does not impact the outcome in
Robinson.
Since Robinson held that the authority to search a person incident to
arrest, in addition to containers on the person, flows from the arrest itself,
whether the arrestee was handcuffed was irrelevant to the outcome in
Robinson.173 Assuming that Robinson was handcuffed, the result would
have been the same: the search of the cigarette pack would have been
permitted. However, under Gant, the search would be impermissible since
166. Compare id. at 762–63 (holding that a search of an arrestee is based on the twin
rationales), with Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235–36 (upholding a search of the person and a
container in which evidence of the crime cannot exist).
167. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
168. Id. at 15.
169. See DRESSLER, supra note 38, at 224 (noting that the “Robinson Court gave short
shrift to the search of [the defendant’s] cigarette package after it was removed from his
pocket”).
170. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (holding that where the twin
rationales are absent, and it is not reasonable to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest
would be found in a vehicle, a search is impermissible).
171. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 222–23 (1973) (stating that the officer possessed the
cigarette pack after removing it from the arrestee’s pocket).
172. See id. at 234−35 (finding a danger of officer safety in all arrest situations); cf.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that a risk that an unrestrained
driver will attack an officer is present whenever there is a traffic stop).
173. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (holding that a search incident to arrest of a person
and containers on the person needs no greater justification than the arrest itself).
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a handcuffed arrestee in all likelihood could not grab the pack from the
officer who had complete custody of it.174 Like Rodney Gant, who was
secured and unable to reach his car,175 a secured Robinson would not be
able to reach into the cigarette pack, even if he were close to the officer
who possessed it. Therefore, an automatic search of a personal container
incident to arrest is unconstitutional in light of Gant.
C. Perdoma’s Faulty Application of Gant to a Search of a Bag
At least one case has applied Gant to the search of a personal container
in the nonvehicular context. In United States v. Perdoma,176 an officer
confronted Perdoma at a bus station and asked him for identification upon
detecting the scent of marijuana.177 Perdoma claimed he did not have any
identification, despite the officer’s knowledge that he produced
identification to buy a bus ticket.178 Perdoma then fled upon the officer’s
demand to see his wallet.179 After his arrest for obstructing a police officer,
the
officers
placed “restraints” on Perdoma, searched his pockets, discovered
marijuana, contemporaneously searched his bag, and found
methamphetamine.180
In its ruling on Perdoma’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine,181
the District Court for Nebraska found that the magistrate judge’s
recommendation to deny the motion was erroneous in light of Gant.182 The
court reasoned that Gant affirmed Chimel’s twin rationales and therefore a
search incident to arrest was unconstitutional absent those rationales, unless
Gant’s second holding applied.183 The court upheld the search by
determining that it was reasonable to believe that the bag contained
evidence of a drug offense since the officer had smelled marijuana, and that
its discovery provided “additional support” for the reasonable belief that
more evidence of the drug crime would be found in the bag.184
The court’s application of Gant’s first holding demonstrates that its
affirmation and elaboration of Chimel must be applied to the nonvehicular
context since the search incident to arrest exception is now re-attached to
174. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
175. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1715.
176. No. 8:08CR460, 2009 WL 1490595, at *1 (D. Neb. May 22, 2009).
177. Id. at *1.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Weeks v. United, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (holding that evidence recovered in violation
of the 4th amendment is inadmissible in federal court).
182. Id. at *2.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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its twin justifications.185 The Perdoma court did not apply Robinson,
which would have upheld the search irrespective of Chimel’s twin
rationales.186 The court expressly rejected the state’s argument that Gant
only applies to the search of automobiles incident to arrest,187 thereby
rejecting the automatic searches of containers on the person allowed in
Robinson.188 The Perdoma opinion recognizes that officers may not
lawfully search when the arrestee is handcuffed189 and the personal
container is in the custody of police,190 making it a near impossibility for
the arrestee to gain access to it. By reconnecting the twin rationales to a
Chimel search, and realizing that a secured, handcuffed arrestee is
extremely unlikely to access the area to be searched, Gant supports
Perdoma’s holding that the twin rationales of officer safety and
preservation of evidence are inapplicable due to the restraint of the arrestee.
While the Perdoma court correctly applied Gant’s first holding, it
incorrectly applied the second holding.191 Perdoma failed to consider
Gant’s express limitation that “circumstances unique to the vehicle
context” justify a search absent Chimel rationales when it is reasonable to
believe that evidence of the crime of arrest would be found in the car.192
Those unique characteristics, mobility and lower expectation of privacy,
are entirely missing when the police seek to search containers, such as the
backpack in Perdoma.
Though technically mobile, a bag is not amenable to being whisked
away as is a car, and it is not susceptible to being moved by the arrestee
when it is in the control of the police.193 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has recognized that privacy interests in luggage and other containers on the
person are substantially higher than automobiles since the former is not

185. See Everett, supra note 122, at 59 (stating that Gant re-tethers the search incident to
arrest exception to its justifications, thereby affirming it as an exception to the warrant
requirement rather than the rule).
186. See supra note 160–62 and accompanying text (describing the application of
Robinson to support the automatic search of containers on the person).
187. Perdoma, 2009 WL 1490595, at *2.
188. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235–36 (1973).
189. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009) (holding that a search is
impermissible, under Chimel, when the arrestee is secured).
190. See supra notes 166–168 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
Chimel to searches of containers in police custody).
191. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (holding that unique circumstances of the vehicular
context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest, absent the twin rationales); see also
United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (explaining that Gant’s
second holding is limited to the vehicular context).
192. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1982) (holding that a search of arrestee’s property in
control of the police is impermissible since the arrestee cannot access that property to obtain
a weapon or destructible evidence).
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subject to the public’s view, nor subject to pervasive regulations that
diminish privacy.194
Not only did Perdoma apply Gant’s second holding when it should not
have, but it also misapplied it. The Perdoma court misapplied the second
holding because it permitted a search for evidence of the crime of arrest
where evidence of obstructing a peace officer did not exist beyond the
actual act of flight.195 The court’s reasoning, that the aroma of marijuana
made it reasonable to believe that Perdoma’s bag may contain evidence of
a drug crime, disregards the fact that Perdoma was not arrested for a drug
offense.196 If Gant were properly applied to the Perdoma case, it would not
permit a search of the bag because the twin rationales of Chimel would not
exist where the arrestee was secured and the bag was in the officers’
control.197 Furthermore, a correct application of Gant would render its
second holding irrelevant outside the vehicle context.
The question that naturally follows is, if Gant would not allow a search
incident to arrest here, would it require the police to obtain a warrant in
order to search the bag? The Gant Court found that absent the Chimel
rationales, and a situation that would activate Gant’s second holding, the
police would have to get a warrant unless another exception to the warrant
requirement applied.198 In Perdoma, the police would likely have had to
get a warrant to search the bag since another exception, such as consent or
exigent circumstances, did not exist.
A hypothetical analogous to the Perdoma case reflects this outcome.
Imagine that police officers witness a person wearing a backpack punch
another person in the face, and then arrest and handcuff him for assault. If
they confiscate his backpack, Gant would not permit a search incident to
arrest, whereas Robinson presumably would. Applying Gant to these facts
would not allow the search since the handcuffed arrestee cannot physically
194. See id. at 13 (recognizing that “[l]uggage contents are not open to public view,
except as a condition to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor is luggage subject to
regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing basis”). The Court further noted
that, “[u]nlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended
as a repository of personal effects.” Id. The Court therefore asserted that a person has a
“substantially greater” expectation of privacy in personal luggage than in an automobile. Id.
195. Cf. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (holding that the evidence gathering rationale is
inapplicable to nonevidentiary offenses such as driving with a suspended license).
196. Compare United States v. Perdoma, No. 8:08CR460, 2009 WL 1490595, at *1−2
(D. Neb. May 22, 2009) (concluding that a search of the defendant’s bag was reasonable as
a search incident to arrest under Gant’s second holding, despite the fact that the defendant
was arrested for “obstructing, along with resisting” arrest), with Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719
(permitting searches incident to arrest of vehicles where it is reasonable to believe that
evidence of the crime of arrest could be found therein).
197. Even if the bag were within reaching distance, Chimel may not permit its search if it
was in police custody since the bag would not be in the area over which the arrestee had
control. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding that officers may
search incident to arrest the area “within [the arrestee’s] immediate control”).
198. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723–24.
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access the bag that is in the police’s dominion and control.199 Here, like in
Perdoma, a proper application of Gant’s first holding would restrict
officers from searching containers on the person when the person is secured
so that access to the containers is extremely unlikely.
Despite its flaws, Perdoma reflects the potential of Gant to limit
automatic searches of containers on the person, thereby curtailing a police
entitlement that the Gant Court found repugnant to the Fourth Amendment.
IV. GAT UNDERMINES AUTOMATIC SEARCHES OF HOMES INCIDENT TO
ARREST
Despite Chimel, many courts have disregarded the twin rationales and
upheld searches of homes when the arrestee was secured and not in
reaching distance at the time of the search.200 Courts have justified these
searches on the grounds that the arrestee was within reaching distance at
the time of the arrest, as opposed to the time of the search.201 In effect,
these cases permit automatic searches of the place of arrest in the home as
they assume that Chimel rationales are always present, even when the
arrestee has been secured and removed.202 Gant abrogates these cases
because a search of the place of arrest within a home is not justified when
the arrestee is secured or removed.203 A recent case applying Gant to the
home context is illustrative.

199. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (disallowing a search if the arrestee is secured); United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565 (1982) (holding that a search of arrestee’s property in control of the police is
impermissible).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1991)
(upholding a home search where the arrestee was cuffed and removed from the room of
arrest); United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 606, 607–08, 610 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding a
search of a cabinet after officers handcuffed the arrestee); United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d
840, 847 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding a search after arrestees were handcuffed and secured by
federal agents).
201. E.g., Turner, 926 F.2d at 888 (“First, we consider whether the baggies of cocaine
base were within Turner’s immediate control when he was arrested.”) (emphasis added);
United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1982) (explaining that the
reasonableness of a search is tied to the circumstances known to police at the time of arrest).
202. See As Time Goes By, supra note 20, at 625 (arguing that courts’ focus on the
arrestee’s position at the time of arrest eliminates the requirement that a search incident to
arrest must be substantially contemporaneous to the arrest, thereby allowing a search despite
the twin rationales).
203. See United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001−03 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
(utilizing Gant to suppress evidence found in a home when the arrestee was secured in a
squad car); LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(c), at 104. (emphasizing that Gant stands for the
proposition that the arrestee must be both “unsecured” and “within reaching distance” for
the “possibility of access” to exist).
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A. Taylor’s Application of Gant in the Home Context
In United States v. Taylor,204 officers arrived at Michael Taylor’s house
with arrest warrants for unlawful use of a weapon and tampering with a
witness.205 The officers found Taylor hiding in the attic, whereupon they
brought him downstairs, handcuffed him, and placed him in the police
cruiser.206 An officer then searched the attic and found a handgun allegedly
lying in an area that was within easy reach of Taylor at the time of his
arrest.207
The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri suppressed the
gun and found that Gant’s first holding, which strengthened Chimel, does
apply in contexts other than a vehicular one.208 Since Taylor was secured
in the police cruiser without the possibility of accessing the gun in the attic,
the twin rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence were not
present to justify the search. The court also noted that Gant’s second
holding did not apply since the unique circumstances surrounding a
vehicular search confine an evidentiary search based on a reasonable belief
to the vehicular context.209 Taylor’s application of Gant shows its
applicability to home searches incident to arrest, and undermines cases
where courts have allowed searches in defiance of Chimel justifications,210
such as United States v. Turner.211
In Turner, the Ninth Circuit upheld a search that violated Chimel since
the arrestee was handcuffed and removed to an adjacent room before the
search of the room of arrest.212 Because officers detained Turner in an area
where he could not possibly obtain weapons or evidence, and was detained
there precisely to remove him from the place of arrest,213 the search of the
room of arrest could not be justified by the twin rationales.214 While
204. 656 F. Supp. 2d 998 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
205. Id. at 1000.
206. Id. at 1000–01.
207. Id. at 1001.
208. Id. at 1002.
209. Id.
210. See id. (stating that cases outside the car context that relied on Belton must be
reexamined due to Gant).
211. 926 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1991).
212. Compare id. at 888 (upholding a search where the arrestee was not within reaching
distance of the searched area), with Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding
that the search incident exception must be confined to the twin rationales, preservation of
evidence and officer safety, and is permissible when the area searched is within the
arrestee’s immediate control).
213. Turner, 926 F.2d at 888.
214. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 465–66 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that after an arrestee is within police custody, the twin rationales do not apply and
that it is impossible for the arrestee to grab a weapon or evidence); see also An Empirical
Reexamination, supra note 67, at 683 (implying that Turner treats the Chimel doctrine as a
game to justify a search by overlooking the fact that Turner was secured and removed from
the room).
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proclaiming fidelity to Chimel, the court nonetheless used a test from a
Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Fleming,215 which distorted Chimel’s
reasoning. In using the test, which considered whether the evidence was in
the defendant’s immediate control at the time of arrest as opposed to time
of search,216 both circuit courts essentially disregarded the twin rationales
since the defendant at the time of the search was secured and not within
reaching distance of the evidence.217 This test, sometimes known as the
“now or earlier test,” requires that the arrestee be in reaching distance at the
time of arrest, and permits the search even after the arrestee has been
removed from the area.218
Implicit in decisions such as Turner and Fleming is the courts’ concern
about restricting police authority to search for evidence upon arrest.219
However, this policy preference giving police a right to search absent legal
justification was robustly rejected in Gant.220 The now or earlier rationale
can no longer be used to uphold searches since Gant explicitly held that a
search incident to arrest is permissible “only when the arrestee is unsecured
and within reaching distance . . . at the time of the search.”221 Since Turner
was secured in another room, not within reaching distance of the room of
arrest, Gant would prohibit this search.
The now or earlier test analyzes the permissibility of a search by asking
the wrong question. Under Gant, the question courts must ask is if the
Chimel rationales are present when the search was conducted, not whether
they were present at the time of arrest, thereby justifying a search when the
arrestee has been secured and disabled.222 Therefore, Gant abrogates all
215. 677 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1982).
216. Turner, 926 F.2d at 887; Fleming, 677 F.2d at 607.
217. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing how Gant would not allow a
search when the arrestee is secured or removed).
218. See, e.g., Turner, 926 F.2d at 887–88 (upholding a search of a room after the
arrestee was moved elsewhere since the area searched was within the arrestee’s immediate
control at the time of arrest); see also Fleming, 677 F.2d at 607–08 (using the now or earlier
test to uphold a search). See generally Bright Line, supra note 4, at 97–98 (arguing that
Justice Scalia’s Thornton concurrence could undermine the now or earlier rationale).
219. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(maintaining that cases such as Fleming that defy the twin rationales by declining to adopt a
test that would be “at odds with safe and sensible police procedures” assume that the
government has a right to search, rather than an exception based on a necessity to search);
Fleming, 677 F.2d at 607 (declining to adopt a rule requiring a search contemporaneous
with arrest as it would conflict with “safe and sensible police procedures” of restraining the
arrestee and removing him from the area of arrest); see also An Empirical Reexamination,
supra note 67, at 682–83 (stating that the court in Turner assumed that the police had “won
the right” to search by the mere fact of arrest).
220. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (rejecting Belton’s rule which
allowed broad search incident to arrest power as a matter of right).
221. Id. (emphasis added); see also LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(c), at 103–04 (arguing
that it is significant that Gant’s rule applies to the time of the search since general police
practice is to handcuff and remove the arrestee from the immediate vicinity).
222. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 465–66 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that after an arrestee is within police custody, the twin rationales do not apply and
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cases that have used the now or earlier test to permit a search despite the
absence of the twin rationales.
B. Gant Undermines an Automatic Buie Search
In addition to undermining Turner and like cases, Gant may also weaken
one of the holdings of Maryland v. Buie, which allows automatic searches
of closets and rooms adjacent to the place of arrest.223 While Buie’s second
holding required reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective sweep of the
house generally to discover potentially dangerous persons,224 its first
holding allowed a search of closets and other adjacent spaces to discover
such persons without any evidentiary showing whatsoever.225 This
automatic search power was presumably based on officer safety reasons: to
protect officers from attack by an arrestee’s hidden compatriot rather than
the arrestee himself.226
Buie’s second holding is akin to a Terry frisk, but the thing “frisked” is a
house rather than a person.227 The Buie Court directly analogized to Terry
in borrowing its reasonable suspicion standard and its sole rationale of
officer safety for a limited search.228 Since a Terry frisk occurs before an
arrest, in order to eliminate a reasonably perceived risk of harm,229 Buie’s
reasonable suspicion sweep is tied closely with Terry rather than Chimel.230
On the other hand, an automatic Buie sweep is more akin to a search
incident to arrest since it modifies Chimel to include a search not only of
the grabbing area of the arrestee, but also of adjoining spaces and closets.231
The majority in Buie stated that Chimel was not at issue and attempted to

that it is impossible for the arrestee to grab a weapon or evidence).
223. 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
224. Id.
225. See id. (holding that officers may search adjoining spaces of arrest and closets
without any probable cause or reasonable suspicion).
226. Id. While the Court did not elaborate on its automatic sweep holding, it is rooted in
reasons of officer safety since the Court labeled such a sweep a “precautionary matter.” Id.
227. Edward J. Loya, Jr., Sweeping Away the Fourth Amendment, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
457, 465 (2005); see Buie, 494 U.S. at 332–33 (analogizing officer safety interests in Terry
with the present case).
228. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 332–33.
229. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1968) (holding that frisking a suspect before
the existence of probable cause to arrest must be limited in scope to discover weapons).
230. See Loya, supra note 227, at 465 (stating that since a sweep based on reasonable
suspicion is analogous to a Terry frisk, Terry is instructive regarding the sweep doctrine’s
contours).
231. Buie, 494 U.S. at 342 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also United States v.
Williamson, 250 F. App’x 532, 533 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing an automatic Buie sweep as
a search incident to arrest); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1438 (noting that an automatic Buie
sweep is closely aligned with a Chimel search since both require only a lawful arrest); Peter
W. Fenton & Michael B. Shapiro, Chimel v. California 40 Years Later, CHAMPION, July
2009, at 50 (“Buie[] extend[ed] Chimel’s application to evidence found in plain view during
a protective sweep of the premises.”).
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distinguish that case.232 It reasoned that Chimel’s purpose was to retract the
expansive search incident to arrest power in Rabinowitz that allowed a top
to bottom search of a house.233 The Court also asserted that Chimel was
concerned about the risk to officer safety arising from the arrestee as
opposed to a dangerous hidden ally.234
However, these arguments fail to adequately explain how an automatic
Buie sweep is not an expansion of Chimel. In his Buie dissent, Justice
Brennan argued that an automatic sweep of closets and spaces adjacent to
arrest is an expansion of the search incident to arrest exception because of
the similarity in the type of presumptions present in Chimel and the
majority in Buie.235 In Chimel, a search of the grabbing area of an arrestee
is permitted due to a presumption that an arrestee may try to obtain
weapons or destructible evidence from that area.236 Similarly, Justice
Brennan posited that the Buie majority presumed that “arrestees are likely
to sprinkle hidden allies throughout the rooms in which they might be
arrested,” an assumption that Justice Brennan found “much less plausible”
than the one relied upon in Chimel.237 Therefore, while Chimel was
concerned about expansive house searches incident to arrest, it also at least
partly founded its rule on the officer safety rationale.238
Furthermore, the Buie majority’s conclusion that Chimel was not at issue
because Chimel focused on the threat from the arrestee as opposed to third
parties is flawed. The majority analogized a protective sweep to a Terry
frisk and relied heavily on this analogy to justify a protective sweep based
on reasonable suspicion.239 Since Terry was concerned about danger to
officers arising out of the person to be frisked, rather than dangerous third
parties,240 the majority’s attempt to distinguish Chimel is inconsistent with
the majority’s own logic in establishing the legal justification for a
protective sweep.
However, Buie’s expansion of the search incident to arrest power
violates the bounds of the exception.241 Chimel and Gant do not permit an
232. Buie, 494 U.S. at 336.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 342 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s assumption
that arrestees will keep dangerous confederates in a house is “much less plausible” than the
Chimel presumption that an arrestee might reach for destructible evidence or a weapon).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (retracting the search incident to
arrest power to prevent expansive searches and crafting a rule addressing officer safety and
preservation of evidence.)
239. Buie, 494 U.S. at 332–33.
240. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (establishing the permissibility of a frisk
for weapons to protect officers).
241. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 342 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Buie’s
expansion of the search incident to arrest power is impermissible since the threat to officer
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automatic search incident to arrest to look for hidden attackers, but only to
protect officers from the arrestee and to prevent destruction of evidence by
the arrestee.242 Moreover, Gant realigned the search incident to arrest
exception as a whole with the underlying twin rationales established in
Chimel.243 In reestablishing the proper scope of the search incident to
arrest exception, Gant undermines Buie’s expansion of the exception to
encompass automatic sweeps insofar as the twin rationales underpinning
the exception need not exist under Buie’s automatic sweep rule.244
A common defense of expanded search power generally, and one
articulated by the Buie Court, is that of officer safety.245 The Buie majority
stated that a home arrest presents dangers to officers on par with, or greater
than, those experienced during street encounters.246 The Buie Court
maintained that officers are more vulnerable in an arrestee’s home than in
other spaces with which they are more familiar, such as a public street or
highway.247
While such language may have superficial appeal, this argument
assumes that house ambushes are common enough to warrant an automatic
sweep.248 It is not clear that the danger of a hidden third party inside a
home is as great or greater than the multitude of other precarious situations
that are routine in policing.249 As noted, Justice Brennan was skeptical that
safety in situations like Buie is less believable than that in Chimel).
242. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (affirming Chimel’s twin
rationales of the risk of harm to officers and destruction of evidence by the arrestee);
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (creating the twin rationales in light of risks created by the
arrestee).
243. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (stating that Chimel’s restriction of the search to the
grabbing area “ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with”
the twin rationales).
244. See id. (reaffirming Chimel by stating that there can be no search incident to arrest
when the twin rationales are absent); cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (“The scope of the search
must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible.”) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring)).
245. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 333 (assuming that officer safety is imperiled in home arrests
to the same or greater degree as roadside encounters); see also Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d
1070, 1087 (7th Cir. 2005) (asserting that the underlying rationale for a protective sweep is
officer safety); Sarah E. Rosenberg, Comment, Buie Signals: Has an Arrest Warrant
Become a License to Fish in Private Waters?, 41 EMORY L.J. 321, 359 (1992) (observing
that the Court, as in Buie, will sacrifice individual privacy in light of substantial
governmental interests such as officer safety).
246. Buie, 494 U.S. at 333.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 342 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the implausibility that an arrestee
would likely “sprinkle hidden allies throughout the rooms in which they might be arrested”).
249. Id. at 340; see also Leslie A. O’Brien, Note, Finding a Reasonable Approach to the
Extension of the Protective Sweep Doctrine in on-Arrest Situations, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1139, 1164–65 (2007) (arguing that the government’s interest in a search generally does not
justify the sacrifice of personal privacy). Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics indicate
that 19.1 percent of law enforcement officers who were feloniously killed between 1999–
2008 died during a traffic stop or pursuit, whereas 20 percent were feloniously killed as a
result of an ambush and 23 percent in arrest situations. FEDERAL BUREAU OF
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the existence of an arrestee’s dangerous compatriots would be so prevalent
to justify an automatic sweep, whereas the Chimel assumption that
arrestees would try to destroy evidence or harm officers was much more
plausible.250
Even more problematic is that an officer need not even have a subjective
belief of an ambush since an automatic Buie sweep is permissible as a
matter of right.251 An automatic Buie sweep, while ostensibly premised on
officer safety, is little more than a police entitlement if it permits an
automatic
search
when
there
is
no subjective fear of physical violence. Justice Stevens rightly underscored
that the searching officer in Buie testified that he did not fear an attack
from a third party.252
It is precisely this unjustified, automatic search power that the Gant
majority found abhorrent. Insofar as the Court in Gant rejected such an
authority, Gant gravely undermines automatic Buie searches.
V. OVERCOMING PERVERSE INCENTIVES
One defense of Belton and cases like Turner that use the now or earlier
test is that without this automatic search power, the police would have a
perverse incentive to leave a suspect unsecured and within reaching
distance of the area the officers seek to search.253 Consequently, the
INVESTIGATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED AND ASSAULTED, 2008,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2008/data/ figure_04.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2009). However, note that these statistics do not relate what percentage of officers were
feloniously killed by a third party during an in-home arrest.
250. Buie, 494 U.S. at 342 n.6.
251. See id. at 334 (creating the authority to search closets and spaces adjacent to arrest
as a matter of right); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1438 (denouncing the Buie majority’s
willingness to sanction “causeless” automatic sweeps in the home). Because Buie allows
automatic sweeps, the original reason for the search, to look for attackers, need not exist.
Case-by-case adjudication of whether an attacker was likely present, or even if the police
feared an attacker, is the antithesis of a bright-line rule allowing police to search
automatically. See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (declining to
consider the subjective motivations of police actions as long as they are legally justified).
252. Buie, 494 U.S. at 337 (Stevens, J. concurring). The officer in Buie obtained arrest
warrants for Buie and his alleged accomplice for an armed robbery, but the illogic of the
Court’s automatic sweep holding is even more palpable for arrests of nonviolent crimes.
Whether the crime of arrest is failure to pay child support, skipping a court date, or tax
fraud, Buie gives law enforcement the power to search a closet and adjacent rooms as a
matter of right despite the unlikelihood of an assailant lying in wait.
253. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring) (listing cases that allow a
search after, not incident to arrest, based on a desire to eliminate a perverse incentive for
officers); see also United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 887–88 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting
the now or earlier test to prevent creating an incentive for police to leave a potentially
dangerous arrestee in the area to be searched); United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607
(7th Cir. 1982) (arguing that the now or earlier test, which justifies a search after an arrest, is
superior to a contemporaneity requirement because “it does not make sense to prescribe a
constitutional test that is entirely at odds with safe and sensible police procedures”). See
generally As Time Goes By, supra note 20, at 620–35 (discussing how the now or earlier test
eliminates the contemporaneity requirement, thereby effectively allowing a warrantless
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argument goes, officers would be placed in harm’s way due to an
unrestrained arrestee. Since Gant’s first holding logically extends to
nonvehicular contexts, one could argue that there are more situations than
just roadside arrests where officers would have a perverse incentive to
manufacture a search by leaving an arrestee unsecured and within reaching
distance.
Justice Scalia explained the perverse incentive argument in his Thornton
concurrence:
The second defense of the search in this case is that, since the officer
could have conducted the search at the time of arrest (when the suspect
was still near the car), he should not be penalized for having taken the
254
sensible precaution of securing the suspect in the squad car first.

In other words, the disadvantage of following safe procedures of
securing the arrestee is that the twin rationales of Chimel would not allow a
search. A recurring refrain from cases using such logic is that “it does not
make sense to prescribe a constitutional test that is entirely at odds with
safe and sensible police procedures.”255
The constitutional test—or more appropriately, the requirement—the
courts are referring to is that a search incident to arrest
must be substantially contemporaneous with the arrest.256
This
contemporaneity requirement is a logical requisite since the very words
“incident to arrest” connote that the search must occur substantially
contemporaneously with the arrest.257 Otherwise, the search is made after
an arrest and is not within the purview of the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement. The other requirement, related to
contemporaneity, to which the courts are likely referring is one included in
Gant: that the arrestee must be within reaching distance at the time of the
search.258 The now or earlier test, on the other hand, forsakes the
contemporaneity and reaching distance requirements.259
search when the reasons for the warrant exception are no longer existent).
254. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627; see also United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664,
669 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (asserting that a court’s exclusive focus on the moment of the search
“might create a perverse incentive for an arresting officer” to keep an arrestee in an area
from which he could pose a threat for a longer period of time).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 82 F.3d 146, 152 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting
United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Turner, 926 F.2d at 888; Fleming, 677 F.2d at 607.
256. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (“Once an accused is under
arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not
incident to the arrest.”).
257. DRESSLER, supra note 38, at 215; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
15 (1977) (holding that a search of a footlocker that occurred an hour after law enforcement
had exclusive control cannot be incident to arrest); Preston, 376 U.S. at 368 (holding that a
search of an automobile after it has been towed and after the arrest of the driver is not a
search incident to arrest).
258. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
259. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (stating that the now or earlier rationale
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The argument for Belton and the now or earlier test is rife with unsound
assumptions. It assumes that without automatic search incident to arrest
power, police will engage in the unsafe practice of leaving the arrestee
within the area to be searched to create search authority under Chimel and
Gant, because the arrestee would be within reaching distance of the space
to be searched.260 However, studies show that police procedures direct
officers to always secure the arrestee in handcuffs, usually behind the back,
and to remove the arrestee from the scene as quickly as possible.261 These
procedures indicate that law enforcement value safety and would rather
restrain and remove an arrestee than leave him unsecured in order to
manufacture authority to search.262
Nevertheless, officers may still have an incentive to not secure and
remove an arrestee when the officer believes that the arrestee is of no
danger to him.263 Despite routine police procedure of handcuffing and
removing the arrestee, it is plausible that an officer would act due to some
improper motive.264 Due to such a motive, and a belief in the peacefulness
of the arrestee, an officer might purposefully leave an arrestee unsecured
near a vehicle, or other space, so that he may conduct a search.265 Though
Gant does not explicitly claim that a search conducted based on a
justifies a search of the area within the arrestee’s immediate control at the time of arrest
rather than at the time of the search).
260. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(discussing the perverse incentive of leaving suspects unrestrained to “manufacture
authority to search”). Another flaw in the now or earlier, perverse incentive argument, as
Justice Scalia noted in his Thornton concurrence, is that it “assumes that, one way or
another, the search must take place.” Id. The implicit assumption here is that the police
must be able to search the area of arrest, even absent the Chimel rationales, thereby creating
a police entitlement. According to Justice Scalia’s Thornton concurrence, if safe procedure
demands restraint and removal of an arrestee, then officers should do so and then not search.
Id.
261. An Empirical Reexamination, supra note 67, at 665; see also Gant, 129 S. Ct. at
1724 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the police almost always conduct a vehicular arrest
by ordering the arrestee out of the vehicle, handcuffing him, and placing him in the squad
car).
262. See An Empirical Reexamination, supra note 67, at 665–66 (analyzing various
police department procedures and concluding that officers are almost always directed to
effectuate a safe arrest).
263. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724–25 (Scalia, J., concurring), see also Anderson & Cole,
supra note 122, at 17 (arguing that Gant creates a perverse incentive that will result in
police murders if officers are careless and decide to value a search higher than their safety);
Bradley, supra note 145, at 49 (stating that the Gant Court invites officers to not follow safe
arrest procedures).
264. An officer may seek to manufacture a search based on racially prejudicial grounds,
or other improper motives such as a desire to assert authority. Nevertheless, the Court is
generally unconcerned about the actual motivations of an officer if his actions are supported
by the appropriate legal justification. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)
(holding that the constitutionality of a traffic stop is not dependent on the “actual
motivations of the individual officers involved” and that “[s]ubjective intentions play no
role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”).
265. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724–25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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manufactured risk of officer safety or destruction of evidence is inherently
unconstitutional, a footnote in the opinion implies this conclusion.266
In footnote four, the Court asserted that it would be the rare case where
an officer “is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real possibility of
access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains.”267 The Court maintained that in a
situation where such a safe arrest is not possible, a search of the vehicle is
permissible due to the twin rationales.268 Arguably, Gant renders a search
unconstitutional if the officer manufactures authority to search since the
officer would have been able to safely secure the arrestee, but chose not to
do so.269 The operative word in footnote four is “unable,” which connotes
impossibility. An inability, or impossibility, to effectuate a safe arrest is
the antithesis of an officer intentionally leaving an arrestee unrestrained in
order to justify a search incident to arrest.270 As Justice Scalia articulated
in his Thornton concurrence, a search incident to arrest cannot be justified
when officers create the very exigencies—the risk of harm to officers and
destruction of evidence—that underpin the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement.271
The fear that Gant creates perverse incentives for officers that will
endanger their safety assumes that officers value a search more than
eliminating the risk of physical harm.272 This assumption is faulty as it
presumes irrationality amongst police officers.273 To the contrary, as
studies have shown, officers in the field secure and generally remove
arrestees from the scene to disable them by virtue of the fact that policing is

266. See id. at 1719 n.4 (majority opinion) (“Because officers have many means of
ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle occupants, it will be the rare case in which an officer is
unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle
remains.”); LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(c), at 106–07 (viewing the interpretation of the
majority’s suggestion in Gant “that the question to be decided . . . is whether the officers
were able to eliminate the ‘possibility of access’” is consistent with allowing a search based
on “genuine safety or evidentiary concerns”) (emphasis in original).
267. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 n.4.
268. See id. (stating that a search will not be unreasonable if the officer cannot make an
arrest so that an arrestee may access the car).
269. See id. (noting that officers have numerous means to ensure a safe arrest, thereby
making it unlikely that officers will be “unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real
possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains”).
270. See LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(c), at 107 (arguing that after Gant, lower courts
must consider whether officers had the ability to eliminate the arrestee’s possibility of
access to the area to be searched).
271. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also An Empirical Reexamination, supra note 67, at 688 (claiming that it is illogical to
permit police to conduct a bad-faith search when they do not subjectively fear that the
arrestee is dangerous).
272. See supra note 235.
273. See Anderson & Cole, supra note 122, at 17 (acknowledging that Gant only
increases risk to officers if they indulge in careless, bad-faith searches); see also LAFAVE
supra note 99, § 5.5(a), at 44 (“Gant should be construed as requiring police to take
available steps to ensure against such a possibility of access. . . .”).
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an inherently dangerous profession.274 Police are unlikely to risk their
safety simply to manufacture the authority to conduct a search incident to
arrest. Therefore, Gant does not endanger officers in either roadside arrests
or other nonvehicular situations.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Gant not only affirmed Chimel, but strengthened it by
recognizing that a handcuffed, or adequately secured arrestee is not able to
reach into the area to be searched.275 If the arrestee cannot grab a weapon
to harm officers or obtain destructible evidence, a search would be
unconstitutional because the rationales underpinning the search incident to
arrest exception would not be present.
While Gant introduced an evidence gathering rationale that permits a
search even when the twin Chimel rationales are absent, this authority only
lies in the vehicular context.276 On the other hand, Gant’s affirmation and
elaboration of Chimel extends to other contexts, such as searches of
containers on the person and homes incident to arrest, because the Chimel
rationales define the scope of this exception to the warrant requirement
irrespective of what is searched.277
In these nonvehicular contexts, Gant’s logic abrogates cases that have
permitted automatic searches incident to arrest, and therefore curtails a
police entitlement that is founded on little more than a desire to provide the
government with an expansive search power. Nevertheless, Gant arguably
creates a perverse incentive for officers to not follow safe arrest procedures
in an effort to manufacture authority to search and bypass Gant.278
However, such instances are likely to be rare, and Gant itself likely renders
such bad-faith searches unconstitutional.279
The right to individual privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment
reflects not only the appropriate respect to be afforded the individual, but
also a check on the government’s power to unreasonably intrude upon this
privacy. Expansive search power is especially pernicious when the law
permits the government to pry into an individual’s affairs as a matter of
right.280 Gant rightly curtails this power. Gant’s immediate effect is the
274. Supra notes 259–261 and accompanying text.
275. Supra Part IV.
276. Supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text.
277. See United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001–03 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
(suppressing evidence from a home search by applying Gant); United States v. Perdoma,
No. 8:08CR460, 2009 WL 1490595, at *2 (D. Neb. May 22, 2009) (applying Gant to a
search of a nonvehicular arrestee’s personal bag).
278. Supra Part VI.
279. Supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text.
280. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009) (asserting that expansive search
incident to arrest power “implicates the central concern underlying the Fourth
Amendment—the concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at
will among a person’s private effects”).
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prohibition of automatic searches incident to arrest in the vehicular context,
but perhaps its legacy will be the cessation of automatic searches in
nonvehicular situations that are still conducted merely “[b]ecause the law
says [the police] can do it.”281

281. Supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.

